Luminous Year in Review 2024

Transcript

Jared Ward: 0:06

Hey guys, welcome to our recurring content series, Building in Public. I'm the co-founder of Luminous Jared and I'm here with my co-founder, Brendan Beebe, so this is our first episode of 2025. So we're going to review how 2024 went some of the mistakes, the good things that have happened and everything in between. Where were we at the beginning of 2024? Like, what was our mindset? What were the goals? I'll start and then whatever I miss you can fill in. At the beginning of the year, in 2024, I remember we had been doing our go-to-market for about three months. We had some success, like a little success, Like we knew we needed to ramp up. We were trying to 3X. So I remember we set a goal to bill $120K by the last month in 2024 or the first month in 2025. So $120K MR, which is about $1.5 million in ARR. At the time we were only billing like $40K actually, like we were actually billing.

Jared Ward: 1:04

We were at 40k so it's yeah it was basically like a 3x increase is what we were.

Brendon Beebe: 1:09

That was the goal yeah, I remember it felt impossible at the time. Like I kind of humored you like, yeah, 1.5 is a great goal, I would have been content with like less than that.

Jared Ward: 1:20

Yeah, I remember you, you're just like, yeah, it's a good goal, and then slowly it came out. I remember one day you were just like, actually, guys like I'm counting on us to like maybe get to like 70k, yeah, something like that, and I was just like what? Really like, I feel like we can actually do this now I, I I did believe that we could actually do it, but I didn't see a path at all. I mean so here's where we were at at the beginning of 2024 with sales, specifically Sales. We were really struggling to close 6K, an additional 6K every month in MRR. I just remember how hard that was. It was me, thomas and Logan the average contract value at that time because, again, we were coming off of like we started off in our go-to-market we went down market.

Jared Ward: 2:15

So I mean our ACV of those brands it was like 500 bucks, 500 a month, 500 a month. There was no commitment. They could cancel at any time, no implementation fee. So when I say we had some success at the end of 2023, I mean like we were. I mean we were practically giving it away Like free implementation, no commitment month to month. Yeah, we made a no brainer. I was just it was Josh and I still like implementing all of them. Yeah, we truly we had some traction.

Brendon Beebe: 2:45

And it wasn't focused, it was we would get whoever we could get. It could be a 3PL, it could be somebody that's not even in a segment we fully service. It was people that needed a lot of features and we're like, yeah, we'll build that as soon as we can get you.

Jared Ward: 2:58

Well, that's another point. You helped describe our focus. Because you helped describe our focus, because that's, I think, we're hitting like on a core point Our focus was horrible.

Brendon Beebe: 3:08

Yeah, like we had a high understanding of, like, who we wanted to go after. We'd evolved into different segments and types of people, we started plotting the complexity curves of different types of businesses, but we didn't understand. The time is that was still far too broad and we had to really, really hone in on. What is our icp? What are the specific factors that point to somebody in our icp? At the point at that time it was maybe like what two or three attributes? And now we're to a point where we have like 10 attributes that make up who is in our icp and I I think the best example of this is the fact that we service 3pls.

Jared Ward: 3:44

That I mean now, mean now all we like 3PL talks to us. We won't even, we won't even respond, we'll just send them to somebody else.

Brendon Beebe: 3:52

Yeah.

Jared Ward: 3:54

Where's the product at the beginning of 2024? I'm trying to remember. I don't remember where it was at.

Brendon Beebe: 3:59

I have a list of everything we've built so far this year that we can go over later, and the product hasn't changed significantly. I would say it's, and actually that's a really great point. There's been some key things we've built this year. I don't think it's facilitated our growth this year oh 100 everything we're selling this year is what we had built the previous two to three years.

Jared Ward: 4:18

What I notice is the product's direct impact to your focus segments is there's like a year lag, there's like a 12 month lag. I feel like just now, with that shift in focus, we're finally starting to really roll out impactful features to the segments that we, we now know we're targeting.

Jared Ward: 4:38

Yeah, that's such a great point actually, and I think the what we were rolling out at the beginning of 2024 reflected who we were trying to service. We used to think that the OMS integrations were a big deal and if you remember even that enterprise contract, it was around oh, should we build our own OMS? So it was focused down market and it was focused heavily on D to C fulfillment. I think that's where we wasted a lot of time. We spent a lot of time on it.

Brendon Beebe: 5:06

Yeah, that's where we were at. Our focus was entirely on all right, let's build an OMS for down market. I even remember we had conversations of what if we just raised a million dollars and put it all towards building an OMS, and the discussion was always like I don't think building fast, like I think the discussion was always we could build faster, but it could be faster in the wrong direction and put us so far off track that it would be hard to come back 100 and keep being a lean team.

Jared Ward: 5:31

At the time, yes, we were building was slower, but it allowed, I remember correct I remember the discussions that we were having and I remember where we landed was like you and I would ask each other at the end of long conversations about building an OMS or partnering with OMSs and going in that direction with 3PLs and D2C brands. The discussion always turned into okay, how sure are you of this? And we both answered the exact same way Like not really that sure, I don't think we have enough data. That was still the answer. Yeah, that's right, and I remember that's what led us to like, not go all in on that route. I was like we feel like we still don't really know. Here's a question Is that different now?

Brendon Beebe: 6:17

Yeah, I have a whole list of, I think, money and resources we wasted on building the wrong things and the amount of things we built that are almost completely wasted compared to the first of the year versus what we're building in the second part of the year is like night and day.

Jared Ward: 6:32

What I can say from a sales and marketing perspective. And then I'm still connected to the product and like what's being rolled out. I'm so much more confident on who we're building towards and it's like I'm never 100% sure, but I feel like I'm 80 to 90% sure, positive on the segments that we're building for and positive that there is a market. So the beginning of 2024, specifically with the sales strategy, like I said, we didn't have a clear path. I knew that we were going to ramp up inbound, but we were very much playing that by ear. I'm a big believer that you don't just like turn on inbound, but we were very much playing that by ear. I'm a big believer that you don't just like turn on inbound and expect that results. We were, we were purposely building out a funnel. That's why we had the Creatably ad, but it wasn't finished, like it had been shot. So that's something that we were always strategic on, which is like build out a funnel of content, redo the website, and we just we knew it wasn't there. Build out a funnel of content, redo the website, and we just we knew it wasn't there, we weren't ready to turn it on, so it turned into what do we focus on to ramp up sales and we tried SDRs.

Jared Ward: 7:34

We tried that traditional route of hire two SDRs and I'm the AE. In fact, at the beginning of the year, that was basically it. It was Logan and Thomas as SDRs, me as the AE. We realized really quickly that again there's a focus issue. They're just going after everybody. The people that respond are tiny brands down market. So that was a big shift and basically it ended. It all culminated with Thomas leaving because it wasn't. He just wasn't finding success. Like he was booking demos. He was booking a lot of demos but we didn't have good commitment on the contracts. It was tiny contracts and weren't getting billed. So, yeah, that's the first thing that pivoted was our whole approach. We started out the year thinking like, oh, we're going to do an SDR team to an AE and we're going to scale that To now.

Brendon Beebe: 8:18

Like our current philosophy is like we don't do SDRs, we're doing full cycle AEs with almost purely an inbound focus for now and we started seeing a more like recurring path and sometime around August like it was two or three months in a row we had closed what we wanted. We had seen consistent churn in certain industries and around September is when we started asking ourselves why are we seeing churn in these areas? Why are we seeing success in these areas? Who are our happy customers? And it gave us the data to be able to segment the data very specifically into who are we winning? Who should we start focusing on?

Jared Ward: 9:06

Well, I want to zero in on a specific point. So let's take it back to we're at the end of Q1. We're barely scraping by with 6K a month, knowing that we need to triple that. Thomas has gone at that point, so it's back to just me and Logan. We've hired Alex officially full-time at the beginning of Q2 with the goal of like, okay, it's time to bring on a marketer to really ramp up inbound. So I was sweating bullets at that time. I was really happy hitting 6K a month.

Jared Ward: 9:37

At the time it was like I was sweating bullets because it's like Logan was doing fine on outbound but we were barely scraping by to close 6k a month and we knew we need to triple quota. So I was feeling a lot of pressure because you know that was. I mean, we both collectively decided to bring on alex, but it was. It was kind of like that man. This introduced marketing salary and ad spin and we spent a bunch of money on the Creatably ad and our goals hinge on inbound ramping up. We were getting like five, 10 leads a month. At that point Something clicked between Q2 and Q3. And I was sweating bullets because it was like we've already spent, I've invested, a whole year into this. Content led go to-to-market. We did this studio which cost about $10,000, which is relatively cheap, but like investment after investment and a year, 12 months of time commitment into this go-to-market motion. So it's basically like this needs to work and up until that point we only really had indirect proof or indirect evidence that content worked. It was basically like oh, it just it feels like people know us more or it feels like people take us more seriously. But we had some data, but not a lot.

Jared Ward: 10:56

I remember there was a pivotal moment in at the end of Q2, when we started AdSpend and I think we had been spending for about a month and I Even my background, my experience. I've ramped up Inbound before and I know it takes a couple months, but there's a point where sales hadn't ramped up and marketing was spending. We looked at all the contractor fees to redo the website, to pay an ads agency and the amount spent on ad spend and it was a good amount of money. I remember we looked at that and Brendan and I were on a phone call and you were just like we need to stop all ad spend and I slept on. It came back the next day and I was just like no, we're going to keep going Like this will pay off, and obviously Alex fought for that too. There was that conflict.

Brendon Beebe: 11:49

It's like looking at the P&L and you know something interesting is that and I probably fall into this is sometimes I think we rely too much on quantitative data because it's like hard and we can look at the metrics and the stats, but oftentimes the quantitative data gets there slower than the qualitative. So it's like you get that, those confirmations on a sales call where somebody is like, oh, I've watched your content and that's why I signed up, which is kind of a soft data point, like you mentioned. But you get that data immediately. Yeah, and the quantitative data is often trailing by a few months and you don't really start seeing or feeling it and can't make decisions off it immediately.

Jared Ward: 12:24

And to close the loop on that, it popped off. Inbound popped off at the end of Q2, beginning of Q3. That was because all of the things that we did in the past the 12 months of organic content leading up the podcast, the edits on the website I mean we spent a lot of money and so much time nailing down a good website that would actually convert the Creatably ad, spending money to nail down the pixel and it just started to click. All of it together started to click and inbound. We went from five leads per month all the way up to 90. In December Inbound became our top closing initiative and that was truly the difference in our ramp up was all of the initiatives that we were sweating over, that we invested in they paid off.

Brendon Beebe: 13:13

That year of work was very low budget in comparison, very low spend, very low burn, like we had a lot of freedom and being able to make this choice because of how little we were spending, knowing that it's going to take more than money. It was going to take a lot of time to start building this process up.

Jared Ward: 13:31

I think that's probably what a lot of people don't understand is our bets, except for the Creatively ad. But our bets were very low cost, like you said, like my first video was, I popped out my iPhone with a free teleprompter app, bought a stand from Target like a little $5 light. Yeah, we're talking like 20 bucks of investment.

Jared Ward: 13:52

Yeah, we didn't go out and spend editors like I mean we were doing that even the podcast dude, I, I remember I would set up the podcast. I hey, brendan, can I borrow your phone? Josh, can I borrow your iphone? But like, set up two of those, go into the, the, the library at kiln. We'd give them to an editor which we're paying like 500 per episode or something like. Don't confuse this. Like we didn't, we didn't like spend you know 20k on a dope setup and 50k on the podcast. No, it's like iphone, iphone, cheap editors.

Brendon Beebe: 14:26

Let's give this a shot it's very much in line with, like, the lean startup method of roll something out, test it, like all this way, as we incrementally spent more money on this, we got more validation that oh it's, it's working, and so let's spend a little bit more money and see how that does, and it did a little bit better and yeah, that's what you're saying about quantitative versus qualitative data.

Jared Ward: 14:45

Qualitative data we were getting that's what I called indirect data before it's it's really qualitative data. We were getting that like so the demos that were coming in there, oh, your website. They started saying at some point, your website is so good. I feel like I understand what you guys do. Oh, this is awesome. Like that was a qualitative data. It didn't directly impact closes or it was impacting it, but we just didn't have enough data to really tell what the impact would be. And then, as soon as inbound started clicking, it was just like, oh, this was all the right move. We could see the prospects coming into our funnel, looking at our content, going to my podcast, going to the book of demo form, always saying, oh, that lemonade ad was amazing. It just it came together beautifully and that's how we hit quota. And then we started ramping up inbound. Yeah, then it did. So.

Jared Ward: 15:34

Segmenting is something that really changed, or I call it focus. This has been a long time discussion with us and actually, brendan, you started out. Do you remember our first discussion about our preliminary discussions, sort of about segments and how to find an inventory tool? We did a whiteboarding session with me, you and Josh two years ago, the complexity curve, the first iteration of the complexity curve. We're starting to develop this hypothesis around specific complexities that our companies were running into and the premise was basically like man, we noticed that most businesses will ideally get more and more complex over time, like with each specific decision they make, there will be a new process or a new feature and software that they have to implement to handle that complexity.

Jared Ward: 16:25

Back then we were talking about like specialty, wholesale, like your 10th wholesale account, or expanding to Walmart or Amazon FBA. We were isolating decisions like that. What we noticed was the companies that we're going after there's like four decisions in a very short amount of time. That makes them feel really complex. That I say all of that to say that's what led us to segments. Eventually, we started segmenting the market by their operational attributes and decisions, and so where we started was like we'll sell to everybody. We just sell to e-commerce, which is so broad, and where we ended up is oh no, we can now group all of our customers, not by industry, by segment, and we have seven segments and churn made sense. There were specific.

Brendon Beebe: 17:19

There are groups of people that churned where we actually could get our head around the turn numbers. Yeah, our question, like that we hit it was like Q3, q4 that we started really figuring out how deep can we go into this. And the question we were trying to answer is like why can one customer absolutely love us, think we're the bomb, think we're amazing, and then one customer turns when they seem so similar?

Jared Ward: 17:36

and it was because it was two customers that were in the same category. Yeah. So, for example, we had we had a supplement brand that wanted features x, y and z, and then we had another supplement brand who's saying they want features A, B and C. This one is super unhappy. They churn this one. Oh, they love it and they feel like we're building towards them. We're like how is that? Like why they're selling the same stuff. And that's what led us to like officially segmenting the market, which is like, oh, now I get it, these two they're the same industry or category, but they're totally different. This one is a one-stop ops, one of our segment names. This one is a simple.

Brendon Beebe: 18:18

Shopify. What you did was incredible Because I know we had been talking about it for a long time, but you finally put in the work and you went home one day and the next day you came back with this spreadsheet, had like a hundred columns. Had every customer we've ever worked with back with this spreadsheet. Had like a hundred columns. Had every customer we've ever worked with listed whether they had churned, whether they're with us. It had like qualitative data on like. Were they happy with us? Were they not happy with us? Because we didn't have like mps scores for them. And then you had listed out every single attribute and then gave us all this data to then begin grouping customers into like all these customers share, you know, 18 out of 20 attributes. All these customers share 18 out of 30 attributes. All these customers share 18 out of 30 attributes. And break them out that way. Yes, and as soon as we could create those segments, it, it was obvious. It was like oh yeah, and we put a name to it and now we can reference it with like.

Jared Ward: 19:03

We have a new vocab to describe the market that we've never had before yeah, and that is what led to focus, because I feel like focus comes through process of elimination, not adding. So once we had the clarity, okay, we have these seven segments. The question was okay, who do we clearly not go after Simple Shopify. So those attributes there were like you're a Shopify store that has like around 10 SKUs, 90% of your business runs through Shopify and that's it. We have like 70% churn, something crazy. And it was like oh, no, yeah, like we will, we will turn down any customers like this.

Jared Ward: 19:34

The second one 3PLs. We have like 60% churn in that segment. No more 3PLs. There's another segment called wholesale. First, you start with big box retail contracts, like with Costco, and D2C is almost an afterthought. Yeah, for some reason we don't serve those companies very well. But the data pointed to was there are two segments that we're focusing on One stop ops and MMW, modern Multi-Warehouse. There's a very specific list of attributes and ever since the focus and the product is driven through that lens, it's just felt like it feels so much, I'm so much more confident on what we're building now.

Brendon Beebe: 20:14

Yeah, I find us. We're saying no to more potential customers, we're saying no to potential features. The roadmap is way more focused in that direction.

Jared Ward: 20:24

Everything feels way more aligned Our two segments that we focus on. There's a crucial decision that leads to the diverging of those two segments, which is early on. You choose am I going to outsource my fulfillment to a 3PL, because that fundamentally changes how you grow up as a brand. It's either the people who say no, I'm going to focus everything on product development and my sales channels, and they outsource to a 3PL. If they say I'm just going to run all my operations into one warehouse that I own and I operate, that's the one-stop ops, somebody who chose to operate everything, all of their business, out of one warehouse, and they're the scrappy operators who just try to figure everything out. So a good example of one-stop ops is actually a company called Pedal Lane. They jam all of their operations that's light manufacturing, purchasing, inventory, control, fulfillment all in one warehouse and the channel mix for both of those segments are the same. But the channel mix for one-stop ops is B2C channels, so that's Shopify and Amazon, wholesale, specialty wholesale specifically, and then also some big box retail in there. You know selling to Target and others.

Jared Ward: 21:31

Another part this is an optional attribute, but not only do they do wholesale but they manage wholesale reps. That's our One Stop Ops, and Petalane is a great example of that. So our second segment is modern one-stop ops, and Petalane is a great example of that. So our second segment is modern multi-warehouse, and those are the brands that decided early on. I'm not going to touch fulfillment, I'm not going to touch operations, I'm just going to focus on sales, and those brands grow up very differently.

Jared Ward: 21:53

And our modern multi-warehouse is basically you have more than two warehouses that you have to replenish, that you don't own, and you have some sort of complex purchasing flow, whether that's I'm purchasing finished goods and then I have to route them to a 3PL here, an FBA here, or you could even have a more complex purchasing flow where you have a concept of raw materials that you have to purchase, send to a co-packer that get manufactured to replenish from there. It's the same channel breakdown, though as a typical Luminous client. So it's D2C, shopify, amazon, wholesale, specifically specialty wholesale, big box retail, and then that wholesale has to be significant enough, where either you're using a rep group or you have internal sales reps.

Brendon Beebe: 22:37

Yeah, I think one of the biggest bottlenecks we ran into as inbound sales reps yeah, I think one of the biggest bottlenecks we ran into as inbound increased was just the impact it had on our CSM team Implementations and setup and answering support questions. These all became more common where at the beginning of the year we had at least a few customers and it just wasn't a big deal. Really it was a few key hires. We found hiring in the industry was really helpful, Hiring people with a lot of more experience. We just needed people who could ramp up quickly, that knew how to run departments, who could run things without us having to get in.

Jared Ward: 23:09

Yeah, I remember it got really bad in September and October and I remember those discussions. All it did, in my opinion, the growth. It shined a spotlight on the lack of leadership in CS. That's what it shined. It was there was a question mark of who does CS roll up to? Is it you, is it me? And then also, who is the leader, which led us to splitting departments instead of one general CS department where Josh and I were just doing everything and then Taylor was like kind of on an island alone, like well, what is his role?

Jared Ward: 23:39

It was very it split on an island alone, like well, what is his role? It split into very specific departments. We said that you were leading CS when it switched back to me, but where it ended was Jared is leading CS. We have implementation department, we have a CSM department, like an account management department, and then we have a direct support department. So three different departments all rolling up for me, which led to us making a VP. Hire Lucas who has that experience. Yeah, cs broke and we made a big, drastic changes within two months is our biggest problem was because neither of us are like csm experts.

Brendon Beebe: 24:11

we kind of just like said it will be figured out and not. Neither of us owned it. Nobody on the executive team owned it, because it was just us two at the time and it was just like it fell through the cracks and finally sitting down and saying, jared or Brendan, you're in charge of this, get it working. We have to figure it out. It was a huge piece of it.

Jared Ward: 24:31

Dividing the departments so that each person could have a clear role, specifically Josh and Taylor.

Brendon Beebe: 24:37

And a big part of it, too, was that Taylor left the company. He was so overwhelmed and I think it was a time for us to reflect on like are we doing things the right way? Yep, taylor was almost like a crutch. He was figuring things out, solving problems, and we didn't have to be involved. And it wasn't until he left that it was like oh, we actually have a giant hole in our company.

Jared Ward: 24:56

Yeah, another testament to content. The first one that comes to mind is our VP of customer success, that's Lucas. How do we recruit him? I met him through an investor's friend who referred me to him. It was a referral Again. I think we were able to recruit talent like that because of our content, and so Lucas was the former VP of customer success at Fishbowl, and apparently Luminous's name came up a lot at Fishbowl because they saw our content. Our go-to-market was really loud, so Lucas made massive impact. I mean, lucas filled that hole of customer success and he's been that leader that we can go to. So that was super awesome hire.

Brendon Beebe: 25:32

And then Jordan was one of our early sales hires. Again, it was somebody I knew previously, but again it was content. He knew a lot about Luminous before ever coming over. Then Brian, right after that, who was an experienced AE, who came over, and both these hires it wasn't money we we aren't able to pay a salary to beat all the competition and so I think a big part of them coming over is the content, but then just our take on equity, and we want everybody in the company, all the employees, to be bought into the success of the company via equity. That will make them part owners of the company. The most impactful hire we made, though, was like early March. We decided to bring on Alex full-time, and she's just killed it. She worked early on for probably the previous what two to three years as like a contractor, and we can never afford to pay her, or we could never afford to actually bring her on full-time.

Brendon Beebe: 26:25

Timing just wasn't right. Yeah, but then around March we had the money, we had an equity, we had a vision and sold her on the idea of coming over full-time.

Jared Ward: 26:34

And I remember that was a difficult decision because it was specific. We don't need a VP of marketing or head of marketing right now. Specifically, we don't need a VP of marketing or head of marketing right now, but based on what we're focusing on this year in our goals, we will need one, and it was kind of a. It was an iffy hire because of timing and it's just like nope, this is us committing to our direction 2024.

Brendon Beebe: 26:57

The other two big hires we made this year were both Utah developers. Up until this team, we had a Philippines team and it's just been me here locally. So we hired Jordan Bush and Calvin Juarez both who I worked with previously and had a lot of experience with and they were just dead simple hires. They ramped up instantly and just the ability to have US-based developers who I can talk and brainstorm with has just been insanely impactful.

Jared Ward: 27:20

And something I'll add with developers is we've tried to hire developers before these people. It's not like it was totally their fault, they're just totally unimpactful. They were not impactful hires, Like they made no impact on the product. So even from my perspective, as somebody who's still in implementation, very close to the product and the strategy, I can say that, like when Calvin came on, I mean within two months the entire UI had transformed. He was constantly fixing things. He made such immediate impact. And then Jordan as well. He's immediately working on high-impact backend projects. So just totally different, even from a non-technical perspective. Yeah, that's cool to hear.

Brendon Beebe: 27:55

And then we made a huge hire around product. I was running into bottlenecks on what I could supply the dev team with Jordan and Calvin Local and the Philippines team. I just couldn't keep up with my day-to-day tasks around product visions, writing stories, planning what we're going to build, the next sprint and so we hired Billy, who was just. He's been amazing. He comes from the e-commerce space. Within the first day he was answering support questions. It was just unbelievable A testament to hiring within the industry and hiring industry experts over product experts or people who do product really well.

Jared Ward: 28:28

And I think also all of those hires. They show how we've evolved in our hiring. We went from hiring kids out of college super hardworking, not a lot of experience, and because of that you trust. Like you give them space, you train them a lot. This round of hires like Jordan, calvin, alex Lucas, there's like a level of experience. These are people who have like 10 years of experience in their field and we still love Carson and Heidi. Oh yeah, young people. I mean think about Logan and Josh. I've been amazing young people. But it's just like a different type of hire.

Brendon Beebe: 29:04

They're the first experienced hires.

Jared Ward: 29:05

Yeah, they're the first one where it's like, oh no, they've done this for 10 years. It's really interesting. The change Goals for 2025 are pretty simple. So we got to 1.5 million, let's get to 4 million, that's it. Go from 1.5 to 4 million, yeah, that's it. Yeah, I know, that really is it. And then, on the product side, it's build an amazing product for first, mmws modern multi-warehouse brands and second, one-stop ops.

Brendon Beebe: 29:33

Yeah, I guess the secondary goal in there is that we want a really positive MPS score. So the development and the product team right now is focused.

Jared Ward: 29:40

For those two segments.

Brendon Beebe: 29:41

It's not focused on expanding the product to do more and more and more things. It's more focused on how can we make these two segments love us and be happier with us with all of our competitors is they serve all seven segments.

Jared Ward: 29:53

They focus on categories and what ends up happening is the way we categorize or the way we segment. All seven segments will say, ah, it's all right, Luminous. We'd rather have these two specific segments say we fucking love you guys, this is awesome, Rather than seven segments saying, eh, it's all right, and that's how you get to a point where everybody hates their ERP. What are we bringing in to 2025 and what are we leaving out? I'd say we're bringing in, or rather we're continuing, all the stuff that did work. So it's a big focus on inbound and organic content. I feel like that's a fundamental business principle is like do more of what works. Like it sounds stupid and simple, but like that's. I mean you'll see if you look at our P&L at the end of 2025, you'll see more investment to organic content, as it's been proved out, more investment to inbound In the product. It's what we're leaving in is focusing on two segments we're leaving out is those five segments that were so-so are really bad. Those are done.

Brendon Beebe: 31:05

I think this year it's really important. We play more disc golf. We left it out of 2024. Yep, we are leaving out curry pizza. It's delicious, but when you go there you smell like curry pizza for the rest of the day.

Jared Ward: 31:15

Well, that wraps up our building in public, our first episode of 2025. Bry Brendan and I are really excited to come and give you more updates. Thanks, guys.

Brendon Beebe: 31:23

Thanks guys.

Jared Ward: 31:23

See you next time.